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Determinants of Greenfield Emerging Market Outward FDI into the UK Introduction
This paper examines the determinants of locational decisions of Emerging Market (EM)
Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the UK. Since the end of the last century,
EMs have increasingly participated in FDI due to the accelerated world globalisation and rapid economic development of those economies to the extent that their share of Outward FDI (OFDI) flows accounts for more than a third of world flows since (UNCTAD, 2015 .
The academic significance of this phenomenon has also been recognised. Mathews (2006) challenged Buckley (2002) 's argument that "the International Business (IB) field has yet to find its next 'big question' to guide research in the 21 st century" by suggesting 'the increasing and significant trend of EM OFDI' as 'the next big question' in the relevant field (p.20). In line with his argument, this paper aims at exploring this phenomenon further.
Although some pioneering studies on EM OFDI can be found by the late 1970s/early 1980s, such as Lecraw (1977) or Lall (1983) , the number and significance of EM OFDI was minor relative to other forms of FDI until 1990s (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012 . Research interest in this trend renewed in 2000, coinciding with the emergence of some significant EM MNEs which showed competitiveness at the global level (ibid). Moreover, the analysis of this phenomenon of EM OFDI has evolved greatly from that which those studies at the early stage found (Mathews, 2006; Gammeltoft, 2008; Padilla-Perez and Nogueira, 2016) . More recent developments in the field of EM OFDI are very 'different' compared to the traditional OFDI flows from developed markets. Focusing on the 'newness' or 'difference', there have been discussions on (1) theoretical framework within which this new phenomenon can be explained in terms of whether new theories are needed or new applications of conventional theories are justified (e.g., Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Peng et al., 2008 ; Ramamurti and Avenue, 2008; Tolentino, 2012; He and Fallon, 2013) , (2) the characteristics of EM MNEs which carry out OFDI in terms of their motivations, strategies, type of FDI (e.g., Makino et al., 2002; Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Dunning et al., 2008; Gammeltoft, 2008; Ramamurti and Avenue, 2008 ; Yamakawa et al., 2008; Alon, 2010; Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012; Contractor, 2013; Dikova et al., 2016) and, related to (2), (3) both the endogenous and exogenous background which influence EM MNEs' behaviour regarding OFDI decisions (Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Buckley et al., 2008; Dunning et al., 2008; Yamakawa et al., 2008; Ning and Sutherland, 2012; Tolentino, 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Dikova et al., 2016; Padilla-Perez and Nogueira, 2016) . More recently, some studies have started to consider the 'post-investment' stage of EM OFDI, such as EM MNEs' performance in the host (Gubbi et al., 2010; Buckley, et al., 2014; Sanfilippo, 2015; Yuan and Pangarkar, 2015) .
However, despite the fact that both the EM OFDI trend and respective scholarly interest have been growing, the phenomenon of EM OFDI to Developed Markets (DMs) has remained relatively 'unreached' within the IB and FDI research domain as argued by several scholars (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Gammeltoft et al., 2012) . It is made more difficult because many existing studies on this theme are mainly case studies on rather anecdotal cases summarising common characteristics or suggesting propositions/models (e.g., Luo and Tung 2007; Yamakawa et al., 2008) rather than testing models or propositions empirically (e.g., Alon, 2010) . Furthermore, EM OFDI has often been dealt as a part of the studies on internationalisation of EM firms in general rather than as a major subject in itself (e.g. Luo and Tung 2007; Yamakawa et al., 2008; Alon, 2010) . Studies focusing on EM OFDI to DM within the host country context, particularly regarding European DM host, are very few and largely survey oriented (e.g., CEPII-CIREM, 2010) . Another significance of EM OFDI to DMs as a research subject is that this phenomenon demonstrates 'distinctive characteristics' (Goldstein, 2007) . It was from the 1980s onward that EM OFDI started to demonstrate a more 'globalised' movement and only recently that those to DMs started to emerge (Gammeltoft, 2008) .
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the phenomenon of EM OFDI to DM, which may provide an additional insight to traditional FDI theories by considering their distinctiveness through empirical analysis. This paper is structured as follows: the next section constructs a theoretical framework for the study by providing discussions as to how to apply and adapt traditional theories for understanding EM OFDI to DMs to develop hypotheses within this theoretical framework. The third section builds a model to incorporate these hypotheses and proposes a range of variables for the panel analysis; the fourth section then examines the findings of the analysis. The final section provides a conclusion.
Analytical Framework and Hypotheses development

Distinctiveness of EM OFDIs and Resource-Based View (RBV)
FDI theory has been developed closely in line with the changes in the trend and characteristics of FDI in order to reflect a certain reality adjusted by this change (Aharoni, 2014) . A similar approach may be required to develop a theoretical framework for understanding EM OFDI to DM host, as this new trend of FDI might demonstrate distinctive characteristics from DM FDI. In doing so, this paper applies RBV and institutional theory (i.e.
New Institutional Economics, NIE). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Barney, 1991; Oliver, 1997; Goldstein, 2007; Chang and Rhee, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011) . At the same time, RBV emphasises the strategic importance of the selection and deployment of resources in a dynamic and evolutionary way compared to traditional FDI theories which see Ownership advantage as rather the "static constraints" of the firm (Oliver, 1997; Moon and Roehl, 2001, p.198) . Applying RBV theory to EM OFDI analysis in this context, EM OFDI can be understood as a strategy through which EM firms evaluate and access resources, i.e., selection and deployment of resources. In a similar context, Gammeltoft et al. (2012) also suggest that EM OFDI can be interpreted as EM firms' strategic process of establishing "fit" between their resources and the environmental opportunities and threats given to EM firms.
To apply RBV to understand EM OFDI, consideration of any differences between 'preexisting' resources and the given environment of EM firms compared to conventional DM firms is required for an appropriate adaptation. The most distinctive characteristic of EM OFDI is 'Ownership disadvantage', which contrasts to traditional understanding of FDI where the key FDI determinant is the benefit from exploiting 'Ownership advantage' by either maintaining a monopolistic position or internalising the FSA due to market imperfection (e.g.
the Firm Specific Advantage (FSA) theory of Hymer, 1976; OLI paradigm of Dunning, 1988) .
The 'Ownership disadvantage' EM MNEs face arises mainly from lack of their own FSA to exploit in foreign markets due to their relatively brief experience of OFDI (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003; Ramamurti and Avenue, 2008; Aharoni, 2014) . Here, 'Ownership advantages' refers to Hymer-type 'Asset-based ownership advantages', which enhance MNEs' monopolistic benefits (Lopes, 2010) . Although some studies argue that EM firms also have 'Ownership advantages' based on Dunning's 'Transaction-based ownership advantages' or 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   n  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  J  o  u  r  n  a  l  o  f  E  m  e  r  g  i  n  g  M  a  r  k  e  t  s   6 home country advantages such as low labour cost (e.g. Buckley et al., 2008; Rugman, 2009 ), Dunning's 'Transaction ownership advantages' arises from firms' ability to coordinate and diversify international operation or exclusive access to inputs in the host country, often resulting from firms' learning experience (Lopes, 2010) . Thus, it can be argued that 'Transaction ownership advantages' in fact relates to the 'L' advantage of OLI paradigm (ibid;
He and Fallon, 2013) and in this context EM firms' 'advantages' related to home country conditions are a special type of 'Country Specific Advantages (CSA)' rather than FSA (Rugman, 2009) . Thus, the argument that EM are often lack their own FSAs is still valid here and this issue is more likely the case in EM OFDI to DM as very few of these cases operate from "a position of global strength or from an assumption of dominance" (Contractor, 2013, p.311) .
Ownership disadvantage can also arise from the context of FDI such as home market or intensity of competition (Moon and Roehl, 2001 ). This is particularly true for EM OFDI as many EM home economies are still in the developing stage, and consequently their home markets face inadequate development and competition (Langlois, 2013) whilst their home countries' strategic-asset levels have often not reached any significant technological development or sophisticated business/marketing method development which fosters firms' competitive advantage development (Tolentino, 2012) . Moreover, due to the intensive globalisation trend in recent years, EM firms face intensified competition in their domestic markets (Contractor, 2013) .
These different firm-specific characteristics and given circumstances from traditional DM OFDIs' have also distinguished motivation of EM OFDI from DMs'. Based on the RBV approach, Moon and Roehl (2001) introduced an 'imbalance concept' to explain some 'unconventional FDI' motivated by 'ownership disadvantages' rather than 'ownership advantages'. They explained that when firms face imbalances in the process of building up (Penrose, 1959 , as cited in Moon and Roehl, 2001) . EM OFDI to DMs can be categorised as this 'unconventional FDI' where EM firms' disadvantages, such as lack of key resources (i.e., FSA), home country constraints and intensified competition in their home countries influenced by globalisation, will cause imbalance among their assets/resources whilst deterring the firms from dealing with the imbalance effectively. In this way, these imbalances caused by disadvantages will 'push' them to go abroad.
Applying the RBV approach to strategy analysis, Grant (1991) Mathews, 2006; Goldstein, 2007) . These studies viewed EM MNEs as 'latecomers' needing to integrate into a world market seen as a "pre-existing" place full of resources "to be tapped" (Mathews, 2006, p.9) and EM MNEs' "foreign expansion as a means by which firms can appropriate rents in overseas markets not only by exploiting but also by exploring valuable resources" (Wang et al., 2012, p.462) . This is particularly persuasive for the EM OFDIs to DMs case as DM hosts' advanced level of resource and competitive advantage will work as pull factors. Here, the highly globalised world, which provides another distinctive context for the internationalisation of EM MNEs compared to their DM counterparts, plays a critical role (Mathews, 2006; Ramamurti and Avenue, 2008) . For EM MNEs, intensified globalisation is exogenous at the initial stage of OFDI, which was not the case when DM OFDI began to emerge (Mathews, 2006; Ramamurti and Avenue, 2003; Aharoni, 2014) . In addition to the 'pull factors' from DM host country, this intensified globalisation works as another kind of 'pull factor' of EM OFDI.
Based on the discussions so far, hypotheses will be developed to investigate the motivations of EM OFDI reflecting the push (i.e., ownership disadvantage) and pull factors (i.e., ownership advantage) from home and host countries. The first hypothesis is regarding 'strategic-asset level seeking motivation' of EM OFDI to DM. Although 'strategic-asset seeking' motivation, or other similar concepts such as 'technology-sourcing' motivations, have been addressed in some FDI studies (e.g., Dunning, 1996; Driffield and Love, 2007) , this hypothesis considers 'strategic-asset level' rather than 'specific' or 'tangible' strategicasset as this study only considers 'Greenfield investments'. Yamakawa et al. (2008) suggest a similar view with their 'innovation seeking EM OFDI' concept, that "an organisational learning motive to access new capabilities" and to "tap into the knowledge bases" of the firms in the DM host countries was a plausible motivation for EM OFDI to DMs (p.68) . Note also that this motivation for EM OFDI is more directly related to the issue of ownership disadvantage. In contrast to Dunning (1996) 's argument that conventional strategic-asset seeking FDIs are usually sequential investments, many initial EM OFDIs are motivated by search for strategic-assets or their level in the host. This is because EM MNEs, which in general lack their own FSA, need to turn their attention externally to develop 'competitive advantage' due to their home countries' relatively poor strategic-asset level (Mathews, 2006; Tolentino, 2012) . At the same time, the advanced strategic-asset level of the DM host is assumed to work as a pull factor. Summarising the discussions so far, this paper proposes the first hypothesis as following: The second hypothesis is regarding 'market seeking motivation of EM OFDI to DM'. This motivation differs from the market expansion motivation of traditional firms, as this motivation reflects both 'push' and 'pull' factors from EM home and the DM host. Facing market constraints at home such as under-developed market or intensified competition caused by globalisation pressure, EM MNEs see the highly integrated world market, which is often growing even more rapidly than their domestic economies, as a new opportunity to expand their business as an alternative to their home market (Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012; Contractor, 2013) . Particularly, the 'more developed market' or the 'more abundant market opportunities' in DM hosts can attract EM OFDIs as pull factors. Luo and Tung (2007) 
Distinctiveness of EM OFDIs and New Institutional Economics (NIE)
Institutions have a great significance in understanding EM OFDI. (Luo and Tung, 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Puffer et al., 2016; Rottig, 2016) ; and lastly, institutional theory has great significance for understanding EM OFDI to DMs when considering the substantial institutional difference between these two markets. The 'distance' or 'difference' between home and host countries of MNEs is not completely new in FDI theories (e.g. Uppsala model's "psychic distance"). It
is not unreasonable to assume that firms investing in foreign countries will face difficulties such as unfamiliar institutional profile including both formal rules and informal culture, and thus, the greater the gap or difference between home and host countries the greater the challenge is for them to build legitimacy in the host market. Considering these arguments and that many EM MNEs are not in the 'mature' stage where firms have enough experience and resources to deploy risky and adventurous FDI strategies, EM MNEs' FDI decision to DM hosts, which is evidently unfamiliar and 'foreign' to these firms, is an unexpected phenomenon. This raises questions regarding 'why' this radical decision occurs, and institutional theory can render useful insights for exploring this question further.
Here, particularly, New Institutional Economics (NIE) is applicable. This theory argues that "underlying costs of transacting" occurs depending on "the existing structure of rights and the character of their enforcement" which define "the existing wealth-maximising opportunities of the players" (North, 1990, p.47) , and in this way, institutions can work as constraints or advantages affecting the performance of the players in the economy such as firms. In developed countries, "effective judicial systems" allow one to have "some confidence that the merits of a case rather than private payoffs will influence outcomes" (ibid, p.59). In contrast, "weak, non-existent, or dysfunctional institutions" and ineffective and/or uncertain enforcement system such as uncertainty of contracts, insecure property rights, inefficient business procedures, or other political instability, corruption and bribes in developing countries including EMs all raise transaction costs in these countries deterring the profitmaximising firms from having long-term horizons for growth (ibid; Luo and Tung, 2007, p.486; Langlois, 2013, p.18; Puffer et al, 2016) .
Moreover, EMs have recently experienced radical globalisation/liberalisation processes.
Whilst it takes time for their home institutional conditions to adapt to these processes due to the natural 'built-in rigidity' of institutions (North, 2005) , EM firms are exposed to global market competition. Therefore, it is likely that there is a 'misalignment' or 'institutional void' between EM countries' institutional conditions and the business requirement of EM firms facing intensive competition caused by globalisation (Witt and Lewin, 2007; Puffer et al, 2016; Rottig, 2016) . Here, a possible EM firms' response to this misalignment is a "partial or complete departure from the business system" as a strategy for "how to play the game", when the rules of the game are changing and not completely known, as well as not constructive for their long-term growth (Witt and Lewin, 2007, p.10; Peng et al., 2008, p. 924 which is what Economic historians describe as a 'missing market' in EM countries (Langlois, 2013, p.8) , as a 'source of advantage' which they can leverage back home or in other foreign markets by reducing their vulnerability and build up competency (Mathews, 2006; Witt and Lewin, 2007) . Barney and Hansen (1994) also suggest that "trustworthiness, as perceived by market intermediaries, is a critical source of competitive advantage" (Luo and Tung, 2007, p.494) . In this way, institutional constraints at EM home (i.e. institutional push factor) and advanced institutional environment in DM host (i.e. institutional pull factor) can work as 'institution seeking motivation' of EM OFDI. Thus, the last hypothesis is developed as following:
H ଷ : 'Institution seeking' motivation is a positive significant determinant of EM OFDI into the UK.
Figure 1 summarises and demonstrates the analytical framework for hypothesis development based on 'adapted RBV from EMs' perspective' supplemented with the application of NIE theories. 'The determinants of EM OFDI to the UK' are assumed to be complex motivations influenced by both push factors from EM home countries, lack of necessary resources and constraints in their various forms, and pull factors from DM host countries, in terms of relatively more abundant necessary resources and better developed institutional context. In addition, the globalised world also plays a critical role as an exogenous condition for EM firms by encouraging them to go out to access necessary resources and environment through OFDI to DMs. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Model (function and variables) and data (proxies and sources)
To test these hypotheses, this paper carried out econometric analysis with a panel of 10 EM FDI source countries (Brazil, China, Czech Republic, India, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, UAE and Ukraine), which have invested consistently in terms of FDI in the UK between 2003 to 2012. As there are no clear criteria for defining an EM (Khanna and Palepu, 2010) , in order to set a specific boundary for the definition of EMs this paper considered the generally agreed characteristics of EMs -that they are 'new' and significant enough to be noticed, but at the same time are not completely 'emerged' due to home country constraints (e.g, Luo and Tung, 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Aharoni, 2014) .
Based on these characteristics this paper selected EM countries which are 'newly joining' to this EM OFDI group such as BRICS and transition economies excluding some mature EMs (mainly New Industrialised Countries). At the same time, this study also included 'returning
Latinas' as they demonstrate characteristics distinctive from those involved in the early stage of EM OFDI, i.e., 1970-80s, within the same region (Goldstein, 2007; Gammeltoft, 2008) . Denoting the source country by i and the year by t, the following is the equation of the panel analysis model: Table 1 ). Independent variables were measured prior to the investment decision as this approach helps in dealing with the endogeneity problem in examining macroeconomic flows (Baltagi, 1995; Benacek et al., 2000) . The following sub-sections will discuss in more detail how the variables were constructed and how the data was sourced.
Dependent variable
The proxy for the dependent variable is 'the number of Greenfield IFDI projects'. The project number was chosen because it reflects "the reality of FDI" such as physical assets and job creation, and thus, can be a useful proxy to understand the drivers of FDIs in a strategic manner (Ernst and Young, 2011, p.30) . The most common possible shortcomings of project numbers as a variable are the possibility that it may lead to under-reporting of the real number and that the investment size may vary greatly between projects (e.g., Hill and Munday, 1992; Fallon and Cook, 2010) . However, some alternatives, such as job number to reflect the project size, also have a similar problem relating to ambiguity in the figure (e.g., new vs. safeguarded jobs) (Hill and Munday, 1992) , whilst some empirical studies suggest that project number has greater explanatory power than number of jobs or other alternatives such as capital expenditure in FDI studies (Fallon and Cook, 2010) . Moreover, the data were sourced from the fDi Intelligence Database of the Financial Times which tracks approximately 80% and 95% of all small and major global Greenfield FDI projects, and therefore, reduces the 'under-reported number' problem of the proxy (Alon, 2010) . Including only 'Greenfield FDIs' in the model was partly due to data availability and does limit the data set, but this can bring some advantages, particularly regarding another major issue of the difference between projects in their sizes. EM OFDI carried out by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and (Lunding, 2006; Dunning et al., 2008; Rogen and Hanemann, 2009; Alon, 2010; Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012) . Thus, excluding these cases alleviates concern regarding large differences in investment size between projects. In addition, by including only Greenfield investments, these types of EM OFDI with strong links to their home government -the motivation of which is often influenced by political rather than corporate benefit (Luo and Tung, 2007) -can be excluded. It needs to be clear that this paper did not intentionally exclude FDIs made through SOEs or SWFs as the details of data regarding the type of source firms is not known, but argues that the data set consisting of only 'Greenfield' projects' can be justified as still valid in its investigation of the determinants of EM OFDIs.
Explanatory variable
The ‫ݐܽݎݐܵ‬ ௧ variable represents the 'strategic-asset level' seeking motivation of EM OFDI.
There is no single variable "best suited to capture strategic-asset seeking FDI" in empirical studies (Alon, 2010, p.11) . For the proxy of this variable, 'the number of patents', 'the number of science articles' (e.g., Berry et al., 2010) or 'R&D expenditure' (e.g., Alon, 2010; Fallon and Cook, 2010) have been suggested. This paper chose 'R&D expenditure' of the host, the UK, for the proxy as this data represents "an immobile, host country advantage" (Alon, 2010, p.11) ; and has a lower correlation with other FDI determinant indicators than the alternatives (ibid). Here, ‫ݐܽݎݐܵ‬ ௧ variable is unilateral by incorporating the host side's data only. 'R&D expenditure' which includes data on both the public and the private sectors is not an appropriate measure of EMs' 'lack of FSA' as EMs' R&D expenditure is often inflated by their governments' recently-growing spending in this area. In addition, EM R&D data does The ‫ݐ݁݇ݎܽܯ‬ ௧ variable measures 'market seeking motivation' of the EM OFDI. Either absolute Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or per-capita GDP has been most widely suggested for the proxy of the market, although these two measure different aspects of the market. The latter reflects the income level or overall market demand, while the former reflects the size of the whole economy focusing on population (Chakrabarti, 2001; Alon, 2010) . Therefore, this paper chose per-capita GDP over absolute GDP for the proxy, as the per-capita GDP of a DM host will be an appropriate proxy for 'market potential', which EM OFDIs are assumed to seek in a DM host, whilst relatively low per-capita GDP of EMs can also be a proxy for 'underdeveloped market' or 'limited market demand' in these countries (Chakrabarti, 2001; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012) . In this sense, this paper incorporated per-capita GDP of both host and home into one proxy, 'per-capita GDP gap', and is calculated as the absolute difference in per-capita GDP of the UK, and source firms' home countries to reflect both pull and push factors from the host and the home. The sign of this variable is expected to be positive.
Finally, the ‫ݐݏ݊ܫ‬ ௧ variable is a measure of institution seeking motivation. This variable is also developed in its 'bilateral' form, incorporating both 'push' and 'pull' factors to reflect the difference in institutions in EM home and DM host markets. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Regulatory Efficiency (business, labour and monetary freedom); and 4) Open Markets (trade, investment and financial freedom). A grade from 0 to 100 is calculated, where 100 represents the maximum score, and it is assigned to a country for each area listed above. The average score of these grades is the 'Index of Economic Freedom' of a country. The 'absolute difference' in the index scores of the UK, and the source countries is used as a proxy for ‫ݐݏ݊ܫ‬ ௧ variable incorporating both institutional push and pull factors from EM home and the host UK. The expected sign of the variable is positive. 
Control variables
To complete the model, a number of control variables are used. The first control variable, ‫ݔܧ‬ ௧ , is that of 'exchange rate fluctuation'. Seeing FDI as a "diversification of real assets by MNEs", home country's currency appreciation to host country's currency may lead MNEs to invest in the 'relatively cheaper' host country whilst the opposite case may lead MNEs to postpone their foreign investment (Faeth, 2009, p.182) . For the proxy, the ratio of official exchange rate (local currency units relative to the US dollar) of the source country to sterling is used. It is expected to be positively related to the dependent variable.
Secondly, a host country's "membership of a free-trade area, such as its proximity to a large market", e.g. EU, can be a possible FDI determinant as it will reduce overall transaction costs for trade with those member countries when investment is made in the host country (Benacek et al., 2000, p.5; Bevan and Estrin, 2004) . Considering that the UK is a member of the EU, ‫݊݅݃݁ݎܭܷ‬ ௧ is introduced as a control variable for its EU membership. For the proxy, this paper chose the UK's share of total intra-EU trade, which reflects how actively the UK is involved in the EU market. The sign of the coefficient is expected to be positive.
The last control variable is ‫݁݀ܽݎܶ‬ ௧ , representing the degree of trade involvement of the EM source countries. A number of studies on EM OFDI suggest that EM source countries' experience of internationalisation through trade involvement in both exports and imports, particularly the host countries, may encourage their OFDI (e.g., Mathews, 2006; Alon, 2010; Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012) . Thus, ‫݁݀ܽݎܶ‬ ௧ is included as a control for EM source countries' trade experience. The proxy is measured as the sum of export and import as 'the percentage of GDP' and expected to carry a positive sign. Table 1 summarises the variables, their proxies, the expected signs and data sources. 
Empirical Results
Panel analysis was carried out to estimate the equation specified earlier. Although the
Hausman specification test results show that the chi-square score is small enough not to reject the null hypothesis, implying that random effects may be preferred over fixed effects, the results at the same time warn that the data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions, probably due to the relatively small data size in this paper (Park, 2011) . Therefore, the fixed effect model was used and the F-test results support a significant fixed group effect in the model. A (Benoit, 2011) . Using the logarithm of FDI causes a drop in the number of observations with a potential selection bias, ln(a + FDI) was used instead of ln(FDI) following most commonly used practice (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007) . Table 2 summarises the analysis results. All coefficients of the explanatory variables showed the expected signs although their significances vary. Firstly, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of ‫ݐܽݎݐܵ‬ ௧ , the R&D expenditure level of the UK, supports the hypothesis that the strategic-asset level of the UK is an important determinant of EM OFDI into the UK. In particular, the large coefficient of this variable (almost a 4% increase in FDI project numbers for every 1% increase in UK R&D spending as % of GDP), with corresponding high statistical significance (at the 95% confidence interval) implies the importance of this motivation of EM OFDI into the UK. This is also supported by other supplementary data on the UK such as recent 'UK attractiveness survey' reports from Ernst and Young which have shown that 'technology' has been one of the top 3 attractions of the UK for foreign investors in recent years (Ernst and Young, 2011 . In addition, in Executive Opinion Survey from World Economic Forum, the UK has always ranked highly in the opinion of the respondent executives regarding the country's innovative competitiveness such as 'Quality of scientific research institutions' and 'University-industry collaboration in R&D' with average scores of almost 6 (5.91) and 5.25 out of 7 points respectively, which have been increasing in general over time (World Economic Forum, from 2003 . These data further imply that although the proxy, 'R&D expenditure' only measures 'quantitative' terms, the UK's R&D expenditure increase likely accompanies the quality improvement, supplementing the panel analysis results of this paper on 'strategic-asset seeking' motivation of EM OFDIs to the UK.
Secondly, although the coefficient of ‫ݐ݁݇ݎܽܯ‬ ௧ variable, the per-capita GDP gap between the UK and the EM source countries, shows the expected sign (i.e. positive, assuming that the high market potential of the UK and the low overall market demand in the EMs' home market respectively have an influence as pull factor of the host and push factor for the home for EM OFDIs into the UK), its value is small (i.e. 0.001) and moreover, is statistically insignificant.
Therefore, the hypothesis regarding 'market seeking motivation' cannot be supported.
Possible reasons for this result can be the theoretical ambiguity in the impact of per-capita GDP on FDI, as "high GDP per capita reflects both high purchasing power of consumers and high real wages" (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007, p.771) . Nevertheless, this variable still plays an important role in this model by preventing the 'institutional variable' from being overestimated in its influence on the determinant of FDI. Omitting this variable could lead to spurious results such that "a significant coefficient of the institutional variable could in fact cover the hidden, positive impact of GDP per capita" due to the potentially high correlation between institutions and per-capita (ibid; Faeth, 2009) . Considering these discussions, taking out this variable from this paper's model due to its statistical insignificance may cause other problems.
Finally, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of ‫ݐݏ݊ܫ‬ ௧ variable supports the hypothesis regarding institution seeking motivation of the EM OFDIs into the UK in that the institutional constraints of EM home countries and the 'better-developed institutions' in the UK work as push and pull factors respectively. This paper's finding empirically supports 'escapism' motivation of EM OFDI which has been often conceptually suggested rather than tested empirically in other studies (e.g., Yamakawa et al, 2008; Ning and Sutherland, 2012) .
At the same time, the UK's "stability and transparency of the political, legal and regulatory environment" has consistently been another one of the top 3 attractions of the UK to foreign investors for recent years, supporting the assumption regarding the UK's institutions as pull factors (Ernst and Young, 2011 .
Moreover, as this variable denotes 'institutional difference' between EM sources and the UK, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 challenging the conventional idea of 'institutional difference' as a negative factor in FDI studies. In fact, some studies suggested that 'difference' between home and host can be a useful source of unique and diverse knowledge (Kogut 1983; Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003) and therefore, can be an attractive point in locational decisions at the pre-investment stage (e.g., Dunning, 1988; Parkhe, 1991; Shenkar, 2001) . Note that this study's main purpose is not investigation of the effect of 'institutional distance' or 'difference' per se. However, this study's empirical result of positive effect of 'difference' between host and home countries on FDI decisions can provide additional empirical support for the above studies, whilst also providing implications for theoretical development regarding the non-linear effect of the institutional difference on FDI at different phases of a firm's investment.
In contrast to the explanatory variables, the results of the control variables demonstrate a mixed picture. Firstly, the coefficient of the exchange rate variable, ‫ݔܧ‬ ௧ , shows the correct sign but is not statistically significant, whilst possessing a very low value. Although this variable has been widely used in the FDI analyses, there is no agreement as to how exchange rates are related to FDI (Sayek, 2009 ) and the empirical results have also been inconsistent (Chakrabarti, 2001) . This may be due to the mixed theoretical assumptions as to the effect of the exchange rate on FDI. Whilst the exchange rate can be interpreted as a 'relative price' of the home currency to the host currency, which determines the prices of the immobile factors (Cost effect), 'a poor/strong currency of a host country' can be interpreted as an indicator of weak/great competitiveness of the host (Revenue effect) (Chakrabarti, 2003, p.163) .
Following this theory, the direction of exchange rate effect on FDI is not always consistent but depends on which of the two effects dominates.
Secondly, the coefficient of ‫݊݅݃݁ݎܭܷ‬ ௧ variable is statistically significant but shows the opposite sign to that expected. The direct interpretation of the results is that the greater UK share of the intra EU trade results in EM OFDI into the UK declining. This is a somewhat surprising result, but it may be related to the recent economic crisis in the Eurozone which occurred during the period of the data set. In fact, Ernst and Young note that "the UK's status as an influential member of the EU but outside the euro makes" was regarded as an attractive point by 64% of all respondents (Ernst and Young, 2012, p.30) . Their 2013 report also suggested that the UK is perceived as a less risky place to invest compared to other stressed euro states (Ernst and Young, 2013, p.16) . Considering these results, it may be that the high involvement of the UK in the EU economy, where the latter is suffering from a sustained economic crisis may have been regarded as risky and thus had a negative effect on EM OFDI decisions.
Lastly, the coefficient of the ‫݁݀ܽݎܶ‬ ௧ variable shows a statistically significant and positive coefficient as expected. Considering that EMs are still mainly focused on the manufacturing industry where trade is an important route to internationalisation (Alon, 2010) , this result implies EM firms' internationalisation experience through trade has a critical influence on their OFDI decisions.
Conclusion
This paper examined the determinants behind the locational decision of EM FDI into the UK using panel analysis incorporating the major EM source countries investing in the UK during the period 2003-2012. With 'adapted RBV approach from EMs' perspective' being fundamental theoretical framework, NIE provided an additional insight for hypothesis development. In addition to incorporating the 'strategic-asset level seeking' motivation in the first hypothesis, this paper also proposed 'market' and 'institution' seeking motivations within the hypotheses, by broadening the concept of 'resource' to 'market' or 'better business Secondly, this paper's 'fresh theoretical interpretations' of an existing theory in order to understand EM OFDI to DM will help not only adjust traditional FDI theories to develop an analytical framework for studies on EM OFDI, but also extend FDI theories in general by considering 'unconventional types of FDI' which are motivated by 'disadvantages' (push factor) as well as 'advantages' (pull factor). For the theoretical framework, this study further developed the approach of an adapted RBV framework from the EMs' (latecomers') perspective by applying a wide range of RBV studies and theories, such as 'imbalance theory' (Moon and Roehl, 2001 ) and Grant (1991)'s resource-based approach for strategy analysis, whilst supplementing this framework with an innovative application of institutional theory within it. Another contribution from this study to the FDI area comes from its 'empiricism', by both developing and testing hypotheses with panel analysis. This study provided empirical support to confirm and strengthen some suggestions from previous studies remaining to be tested through its analysis results and findings. Moreover, although this paper has limits in terms of the relatively small size of the data set, more data of both EM sources and the time periods is also likely to become available enabling the market to be further tested for robustness (UNCTAD, 2015) . Therefore, the potential of the model and the analysis result to be further refined is substantial.
Lastly, in addition to its academic contribution, this paper also has policy implications from the host side perspective. Understanding the determinants of EM OFDI, an increasingly important source of FDI, can help host governments to set up and implement appropriate policies to attract FDI from these markets. For example, the analysis strongly suggested that one of the major attractions for EM Greenfield firms to invest in the UK is the 'strategic-asset level' or 'innovation level' of the UK. Therefore, the UK government needs to focus on enhancing the quality and competitiveness of its Higher Education and other technology/research sectors as well as their collaboration with industry, whilst investing in more fundamental areas such as early education and mathematics/science education. These will be "crucial to continue fostering innovation in the country" in order to maintain its competitiveness at the 'strategic-asset ' and 'innovation' level (World Economic Forum, 2014, p.22) . Another policy implication can come from regarding the UK within the EU context.
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